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Abstract 
Using panel data of public unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 34 OECD 
nations across year 1980-2010, I explore the effect of this ratio on three unemployment 
outcomes: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment, as 
well as labor participation rate and investment rate. After taking into account potential 
endogeneity of this ratio using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, I find the data does not support the 
hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance (UI) expenditure in theory but 
gives strong support for hypothesized disincentive effect in theory. The estimates indicate that 
every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to GDP 
leads to 0.9 to 1.1 percentage point increase in total unemployment rate and 4.5 to 4.7 
percentage point increase in long term unemployment rate. The distortionary effect of UI 
program on business is also verified by an estimate that every percentage point increase in this 
unemployment spending rate is associated with about 2.1 percentage point decrease in 
investment rate. 
 
 
1. Background 
This paper is an academic exploration of the claim in a Wall Street Journal article: Bernanke: 
Unemployment Benefits Don’t Keep Jobless Rate High1. The claim of the chairman of Federal 
Reserve is that providing benefits to workers without a job likely doesn’t contribute to the 
jobless rate or the high level of the long-term unemployed.  According to this WSJ report, 
                                                           
1 http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/03/26/bernanke-unemployment-benefits-dont-keep-jobless-rate-high/ 
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Bernanke’s remark was a response to questions at the annual conference of the National 
Association for Business Economics. The original quote of the Federal Reserve Chairman’s 
answer is “I would not attribute the extent of long-term unemployment or the very high level of 
unemployment to unemployment insurance.” 
Whether the provision and generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) increases unemployment 
has been the subject of much research (See Holmlund (1998), Krueger & Meyer (2002), and 
Fredriksson & Holmlund (2006) for recent reviews of the literature). Theory generally predicts 
that UI has two offsetting effects on unemployment, as the following section elaborates, leaving 
the net impact of UI an empirical issue for investigation. 
Most of previous studies on the relationship between UI and unemployment were based on micro 
data. The use of data over countries or regions, observed at different points in time, is 
presumably a more promising way to estimate the equilibrium effects of variations in UI benefit 
generosity. The prototypical US study in this vein (e.g. Katz & Meyer, 1990) uses policy 
changes at the state level to identify the effects. However, this approach can be criticized because 
policy changes at the state level are endogenous with respect to the local business cycle, see for 
example Card & Levine (2000) and Lalive & Zweimüller (2004). 
Card & Levine (2000) used variations in the national UI rules to estimate the effects at the 
regional level. Hence, the estimates should not suffer from the potential policy endogeneity 
hampering studies using regional policy changes for identification. The evidence suggests that 
benefit generosity increases unemployment and the estimates are robust across alternative 
specifications. The magnitudes involved are rather substantial and appear to be relatively high 
compared to estimates available elsewhere in the literature. The estimates suggest that an 
increase in the (actual) replacement rate of 5 percentage points contributes to increasing 
unemployment by 25 percent. 
However Valletta and Kuang (2010) find that the effect in the downturn since 2008 appears quite 
small compared with other determinants of the unemployment rate. Their analyses suggest that 
extended UI benefits account for about 0.4 percentage point of the nearly 6 percentage point 
increase in the national unemployment rate over the past few years. This paper drafted by 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco seems to provide some evidence to support Chairman 
Bernanke’s claim. 
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Barro (2012) found that that UI benefit extensions (from 26 weeks to 99 weeks) raised the 
unemployment rate by 2.7 percentage point (from 6.8% to 9.5%). However, Rothstein (2011) 
finds that that UI benefit extensions (from 26 weeks to 99 weeks) raised the unemployment rate 
in early 2011 by only about 0.1-0.5 percentage points, much less than is implied by previous 
analyses. Howell and Azizoglu (2011) used a survey of studies on unemployment insurance’s 
effect on employment to conclude that that unemployed who collected UI did not find 
themselves out of work longer than those who didn’t have unemployment benefits; and that 
unemployed workers did not search for work more or reduce their wage expectations once their 
benefits ran out. 
 
This paper aims to investigate: 1) do the two effects of unemployment insurance (UI) on 
unemployment rate at macro level hold predicted by theory hold: aggregate demand effect and 
incentive effect? 2) What is the net effect of public unemployment spending as percentage of 
GDP (rather than duration of UI) on three unemployment measures: total unemployment rate, 
long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment rate; 3) what is the magnitude of this 
effect based on panel data of OECD nations.  The public unemployment spending rate is a better 
measure of the scale of overall governmental financial assistance to unemployed people than 
duration of UI when the study purpose is on macro effect of this entitlement program. 
 
The variables used in this paper, data source and time coverage of each variable are presented in 
table 1. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. Table 3 shows 
the correlation between unemployment outcomes and the unemployment spending rate 
(unem_exp). The correlations between total unemployment rate/long term unemployment rate 
and unem_exp are positive and statistically significant but that between youth unemployment 
rate and unem_exp is not statistically significant, suggesting that public unemployment spending 
affects youth less than adult. This may be related to the fact that the level of UI benefits depends 
upon previous earnings so that the disincentive effect of UI is smaller for youth than senior 
workers. The correlation between working hours (hours) and unem_exp is negative and strongly 
significant, supporting disincentive effect of the theory explained below. Although the 
correlation between log of per capita GDP (logypc) and unem_exp supports the aggregate 
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demand effect of the theory, that between household consumption relative to GDP goes against 
the theory. 
 
 
2. Theory 
In theory, an increase in unemployment insurance has two effects. First is the disincentive 
effects. The second is the aggregate demand effect, as claimed by Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO 2010) . 
Suppose employment supply and employment demand (ns and nd, respectively) are given by: 
(1) ns = α0 + α1 UI + α2 w  
(2) nd = β0 + β1UI + β2w  
Where UI is a measure of unemployment insurance payments, and w is the wage rate. According 
to the theory, α1 < 0, α2 > 0; β1 > 0; β2 < 0 . Hence, we are assuming some disincentive effects 
from UI, but stimulative effects from UI increasing consumption and hence demand for labor. 
CBO(2012) supports these two effects, its explanation of (1) and (2) are (page 9): 
• UI benefits increase incentives for workers who lose their job to look for work (by 
requiring them to do so in order to receive benefits) but reduce the incentives to accept a 
job offer. 
• The UI system serves as an automatic economic stabilizer by supporting consumer 
spending when income falls, which in turn boosts aggregate economic activity. 
 
Its overall conclusion on these two offsetting effects is “the positive impact of the additional UI 
benefits on the demand for goods and services—and thus on economic activity—has been 
significantly larger than the net impact on economic activity of the various other ways in which 
the increase in UI benefits has affected the economy (including greater incentives to search for a 
job and reduced incentives to accept a job offer). So it thinks that the effect of (2) is larger than 
(1). Specifically, it estimates that that the policy of increasing Aid to the Unemployed would add 
8 to 19 cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per million 
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dollars of total budgetary cost.2(CBO (2010)). It also estimates that extending additional 
unemployment benefits , or even combined with paying health insurance premiums would raise 
output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 by $0.70 to $1.90 per dollar of total budgetary cost. 
No detail about how this estimate was calculated was provided. To test whether these estimates 
hold, this paper tries to use macro panel data of 29 OECD countries to investigate the overall 
effects of public unemployment expenditure by government on three unemployment measures: 
total, long-term and youth unemployment rates, household consumption relative to GDP and per 
capita GDP. 
CBO (2010) claimed that, “Households receiving unemployment benefits tend to spend the 
additional benefits quickly, making this option both timely and cost-effective in spurring 
economic activity and employment”, so it is expected that household consumption as a 
percentage of GDP should rise due to this stimulative effect of UI and as a result so does to per 
capita income. CBO (2012) argues that UI benefits increase incentives for workers who lose 
their job to look for work because of eligibility requirement of UI but reduces the incentives to 
accept a job offer thus raising unemployment rate. CBO (2010) also admits that UI could 
dampen people’s efforts to look for work. Actually both may be true. The net effect is, based on 
CBO’s conclusion is the automatic stabilizer effect dominates incentive effect of UI. To test 
whether this conclusion has any empirical evidence to support is one motivation of this paper. 
Another aim of the paper is to investigate the long term effect of unemployment public 
expenditure in terms of long term unemployment rate, which is the proportion of people who 
have been unemployed for 12 months or more among all unemployed. This may be more policy 
interest for decision makers. 
Since one eligibility requirement of UI program is claimant is looking for job and has not given 
up job hunting, it is expected unemployment welfare spending will increase labor participation 
rate although some applicants may not be sincerely looking for jobs. The effect of unem_exp on 
labor participation rate will also be investigated in this paper. 
The theory on the two effects of UI only concerns the behavior of individuals. UI programs may 
also impact on the behavior of business because of increases in taxes required to pay for the 
                                                           
2 Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 2010 and 2011, January 2010, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SECOND AND D STREETS, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10803/01-14-employment.pdf 
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program. The possible effect of public unemployment welfare expenditure on business, 
particularly on investment rate will also be explored. 
This paper will test two effects in theory first and then develop a full-fledged model on 
unemployment outcomes and labor participation rate with more control variables before testing 
the effect on overall investment rate of business. 
 
3. The Model and Estimation Approach 
 
3.1 The model for testing two effects in theory 
The model for testing aggregate demand effect and incentive effect of UI is just a standard two-
way fixed effect model implemented by LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variable) estimation or IV 
estimation for panel data, depending on significance of the statistic of Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
Endogeneity test after instrument variable (IV) strength test, as explained in details later. 
To test the hypothesized disincentive effect of unem_exp, labor supply is proxied by hours 
(Average hours actually worked per person per year in employment), which is taken as response 
variable. The explanatory variables include wage growth rate (wageg, annual growth rate of 
labor compensation per labor unit) and labor productivity growth rate (labor_prodg). To test the 
hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unem_exp, two variables are used to represent change 
in aggregate demand: household consumption as a percentage of GDP (hh_consumr) and log of 
per capita GDP (logypc), the first of which is for testing if unem_exp has stimulating effect on 
consumption, as proposed in theory, the second of which is for testing if ultimately unem_exp 
can promote aggregate demand and income, which is hypothesized by theory and expected by 
CBO.  The two variables hh_consumr and logypc are taken as dependent variable separately and 
they have the same set of independent variables: unem_exp, wageg, long_real_r(long real 
interest rate) and inflation, the last two of which may affect household’s choice between 
consumption and saving. 
Because the data is panel data, all regressions will include fixed effects of both country and year. 
The reason to choose fixed effect (FE) model rather than random effect (RE) model is for 
controlling unobservable time-invariant country heterogeneity and global time trend of 
technology despite the fact that RE estimator may have higher efficiency than FE estimator when 
unobservables are not correlated with included explanatory variables.  
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The implementation of this two-way FE model is the classical approach of LSDV Regression : 
adding two sets of dummy variables for country and year, respectively to the OLS regression.  
 
3.2 Full model 
The specification of the full-fledged model is: 
        itiitittitit ucwxyy +++++= − δγθα1          t=1,2,…,T                                             (3) 
where ity  is the unemployment rate (total, youth, or long-term unemployment) or labor 
participation rate (LPR)for country i at time t. 
 1−ity  captures persistence of unemployment or LPR. 
As Bernal-Verdugo et. al. (2012) point out, 
it is important to note there is high persistence of unemployment rates. According to their 
estimation results, a one percentage point increase in previous unemployment translates into a 
0.83 percentage point higher unemployment in the current period, which can be dubbed as a 
“momentum” effect of pre-existing unemployment rate levels. OECD (2006) also indicates that a 
macroeconomic shock might not only raise current unemployment but, in addition, its effects 
might persist over time. In order to assess initial versus persistence effects of shocks, a dynamic 
version of the standard fixed effect (FE) model is needed. Following Wooldrige (2001, pp. 299), 
two-period and three-period lagged values of the response variable are used to instrument 1−ity  to 
make sure consistency of estimators in (3). 
itx  is 1 x 6 vector and contains 6 observable explanatory variables which are assumed to be 
strictly exogenous, these six control variables included in the full model for unemployment rates 
and participation rate are: labor productivity growth rate (labor_prodg), percentage change in the 
terms of trade weighted by the trade openness of the country(dtot), inflation rate(inflation), long 
real interest rate (long_real_r, the nominal returns on long-term government bond minus the 
actual inflation rate over the following year) and international trade openness(% of GDP, 
trade_open) and population density (popd). The choice of first four control variables 
(labor_prodg, dtot, inflation, long_real_r) closely follows IMF (2003) and OECD (2006). The 
inclusion of trade openness and population density as control variables for unemployment rates 
follows Bernal-Verdugo et. al.(2012). Felbermayr et. al. (2009) also finds that higher trade 
openness is causally associated to a lower structural rate of unemployment. Among the control 
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variables, long real interest rate can at least partially capture aggregate demand shocks in 
business cycle. 
itw is the key variable of interest: Public social expenditure on unemployment benefit programs 
as a percentage of GDP, which may be endogenous. i
c
 represent country fixed effects that 
capture unobserved country-specific determinants of unemployment, which may include some 
variables with high time constancy, such as national cultural (tradition) towards trade-off 
between leisure and work . tθ  is a fixed effect term for time, which captures global trend of some 
growth determinants that are common to all OECD countries, such as worldwide technology 
progress or global economic downturns or booms. Rothstein (2011) found that the “vast 
majority” of unemployment was due to “demand shocks” not “UI-induced supply reductions.” 
This term tθ  can at least partially capture global demand shocks. The inclusion of this fixed 
effect and the control variable long_real_r can enable us to test whether Rothstein (2011)’s claim 
holds after controlling for demand shocks. it
u
 are idiosyncratic errors, which also absorb some 
time-varying omitted variables, such as home ownership (as pointed out by OECD (2006, p218), 
Home ownership is correlated with unemployment). Overall, this is a two-way fixed effect 
model for unbalanced panel data.  
In all the models, public welfare expenditure on unemployment as a percentage of GDP 
(unem_exp) is the key variable of interest and possibly endogenous. To address this possible 
endogeneity, the approach of instrument variable (IV) estimation for panel data will be used. To 
establish validity of the IV used, IV strength test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) Endogeneity 
test will be performed first to determine 1) if unem_exp is endogenous thus if IV estimation is 
necessary rather than LSDV estimation for panel data and 2) if IV is strong or weak. The details 
of these two tests are provided below in section 3.3.  If DWH statistic is significant at 10% level 
but not at 5% level, then both LSDV and IV estimation results will be presented for comparison. 
These two tests will be applied first for the tests on hypothesized disincentive effect and 
aggregate demand effect as explained in section 3.1 and then for the tests of full models that 
examine the economic impacts of unem_exp on unemployment outcomes (total, long-term and 
youth unemployment rates), labor participation rate and investment, the last of which is for 
testing the mechanism through which unem_exp impacts unemployment.  
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3.3 Test Endogeneity of public expenditure on unemployment  
It is likely that changes in unemployment induce changes in public welfare spending on 
unemployment (unem_exp). Unemployment may have both positive and negative impacts on 
public expenditure on unemployment benefits. For the first one, when unemployment rate is 
high, there are more claimants of /applicants for UI benefits and government is more likely to 
extend UI coverage time to alleviate the pain of the unemployed, as a result, the welfare 
expenditure on unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP tends to rise. For the second one, 
higher unemployment is always accompanied by lower GDP growth, which is translated to lower 
tax income for government, which in turn may decrease welfare expenditure due to more scarce 
financial resources for re-allocation, one of which may be public expenditure on unemployment 
insurance provided by government. On the other hand, the effect of unemployment on UI 
expenditure may arise through another channel: higher unemployment and lower growth indicate 
bad economy, fewer job opportunities and lower income for working people, so it may be an 
incentive for heavier dependence on welfare benefits at the time of economic downturn, 
particularly unemployment insurance benefits. In short, there may exist reverse causality or 
feedback effect from unemployment rate to welfare expenditure on unemployment, which 
violates strict exogeneity assumption for the latter for Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. 
If this assumption fails, the consistency of FE estimates on unem_exp is questionable. The 
Omitted variables, whose data is unavailable or unobservable to us, such as home ownership, 
may also be the source of endogeneity, as they may be correlated with unem_exp. 
I apply classical Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test to check whether welfare spending on 
unemployment is endogenous in our regressions for unemployment rates thus whether IV 
estimation is necessary. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test, 
which can easily be formed by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side 
variable, as a function of all exogenous variables and instrument variable(s), in a regression of 
the original model. The key requirement for this approach is that we can correctly identify all 
other strictly exogenous variables except suspicious endogenous variable(s) and we can find a 
valid IV, which has to be strongly correlated to welfare spending on unemployment but has no 
direct impact on unemployment outcomes(is uncorrelated with the unobservable error in 
regression). 
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The choice of IV is the trickiest part of DWH test or IV regression. Beraldo et. al. (2009) used 
lagged values (up to three period) of possibly endogenous variables (health spending variables). 
These IVs are of course strongly correlated with endogenous variables but the exogeneity of 
them is highly suspicious. Using lagged values of possibly endogenous variables as instruments 
is never an appropriate way to ensure strictly exogeneity of the instruments for panel data. As 
Angrist & Krueger (2001) pointed out, “One of the most mechanical and naive, yet common, 
approaches to the choice of instruments uses atheoretical and hard-to-assess assumptions about 
dynamic relationships to construct instruments from lagged variables in time series or panel data. 
The use of lagged endogenous variables…is problematic if the equation error or omitted 
variables are serially correlated”. It is easy to verify that unemployment rate regressions always 
have residual errors serially correlated. So Beraldo et.al. (2009)’s approach of using one to three 
period lagged values of endogenous variable (health welfare expenditure) as instrument variables 
makes the exogeneity of these IVs very questionable. 
The instrument variable (IV) chosen for public expenditure on unemployment (unem_exp) is 
road fatalities per million inhabitants (road) whose data comes from OECD Factbook 2010. Road 
fatality means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of a road injury 
accident. Suicides involving the use of a road motor vehicle are excluded. The justification of the 
validity of this IV is elaborated as follows. 
Death rate from road accidents presumably cannot affect unemployment and seems to have 
nothing to do with the omitted variables that affect unemployment rate, such as home ownership. 
However, this rate may be related to welfare spending in this way: in welfare states with higher 
welfare expenditure by government and more generous welfare benefit programs (including 
unemployment insurance program), people tend to have more leisure time and slower life pace. 
To prove this, a simple fixed effect model of hours on unem_exp is run where hours, as defined 
before, is average hours actually worked per year per person in employment. Table 4 shows that 
average annual hours actually worked per worker in OECD nations have strong negative 
association with public social expenditure on unemployment as a percentage of GDP. The 
estimate of unem_exp indicates that on average, in an OECD country, one percentage increase in 
welfare spending rate on unemployment (relative to GDP) leads to a reduction of working hours 
by about 68.2 hours in one year, or about 8.5 working days. This is a substantial effect. It implies 
that if Spain, whose average welfare spending rate on unemployment is 2.16% across 1980-2010, 
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decreases this rate to the level of USA for the same period, 0.33%, an average Spanish worker 
would work longer by about 124.8 hours annually, nearly 16 working days! 
Different patterns of time allocation between working and leisure lead to different life paces. The 
life pace is presumably closely related to the probability of traffic accidents. Through life pace, a 
country’s road accident fatality is linked to its welfare level. The overall IV relevance test is 
performed by running a Least Squares Dummy Variable Regression (LSDV) of  unem_exp on 
the IV (road) and other exogenous control variables. For example, to test the disincentive effect 
of unem_exp, two control variables are included: labor_prodg and wageg. Table 4 demonstrates 
that the IV road is a strong IV for unem_exp in this case (F statistic 25.28, p value 0), according 
to Sotck and Yogo (2005)’s thumb rule of F value exceeding 10 for one endogenous variable. It 
is also a very strong IV for testing the aggregate demand effect of unem_exp (F statistic 35.62, p 
value 0).   
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test can be performed as follows: we first regress unem_exp 
on all other explanatory variables in final regression, the instrument variable (road), dummy 
variables for each country  and dummy variables for each year and obtain the residual, 2
^
v . Then 
we simply include 2
^
v  along with unity, all the explanatory variables in final model, either 
endogenous or exogenous, and dummy variables for nations and years in an OLS regression and 
obtain the t statistic on 2
^
v . The p values for the estimated parameters of  2
^
v  can indicate whether 
unem_exp is endogenous in the respective final regression.  The last column of table 4 indicates 
that unem_exp is endogenous for the regression of hours ( pvalue =0.0479) but not endogenous 
for hh_consumr (pvalue=0.177) at 5% significance level  , so 2SLS estimation is only necessary 
for the regression of hours to ensure consistency of the estimate of unem_exp.  For the regression 
of logypc, the DWH statistic of unem_exp is significant at 10% level but insignificant at 5% 
level (p value=0.0561). Since this p value is between 5% and 10%, both IV and LSDV 
regressions were run and results were compared.  
 
 
4. The Results 
Table 4 is a summary of econometric test results on the two effects of UI in theory. The result 
supports incentive effect of the theory, it indicates that public expenditure on unemployment has 
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significant negative impact on equilibrium labor supply. Every percentage increase in unem_exp 
decreases average hours actually worked by about 68, or about 8.5 business days.  This proves 
hypothesized disincentive effect of unemployment insurance. However, unem_exp is found to 
have no significant effect on total consumption relative to GDP (hh_consumr) (p value=0.642), 
which disproves hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance. It is also 
shown that unem_exp has significant negative effect on log of per capita GDP (p value is 0.09 
for OLS estimate and 0.009 for IV estimate), which is against the aggregate demand effect of 
unemployment insurance in theory.  
As mentioned earlier, CBO estimates that that the policy of increasing aid to the unemployed 
would add 8 to 19 cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per 
million dollars of total budgetary cost.3 No detail about how this estimate was calculated was 
provided. Our econometric estimation result refutes the stimulative effect of welfare spending on 
employment, casting doubt on the validity of CBO’s estimate. On the country, we find evidence 
suggesting that public expenditure on unemployment insurance may dampen aggregate demand 
and income and have a net negative impact on employment and economy. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the full model. To capture persistence of unemployment rate (or 
labor participation rate), one year lagged value of response variable is included and instrumented 
by two-year and three-year lagged values of response variable to correct for estimation 
inconsistency. Since DWH tests in table 5 show that public unemployment spending rate is not 
endogenous for all three unemployment rate measures but not endogenous for labor participation 
rate, we only include IVs for lagged dependent variable in the regressions for three 
unemployment rates but for the regression for labor participation, we add additional IV of road.  
Table 6 shows that public expenditure on unemployment has significantly positive effect on total 
unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate but no significant effect on youth 
unemployment rate, the latter of which is consistent with the expectation that  because the level 
of UI benefits depends upon previous earnings so UI has not much effect on youth 
unemployment. On average, each percentage point increase in welfare expenditure of 
unemployment benefit relative to GDP can increase total unemployment rate by 0.89 percentage 
                                                           
3 Policies for Increasing Economic Growth and Employment in 2010 and 2011, January 2010, 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, SECOND AND D STREETS, S.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10803/01-14-employment.pdf 
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point. In other words, increasing unemployment welfare spending rate by one standard deviation 
raises total unemployment rate by 0.69 percentage point (0.8878*0.7773).  Is this effect large or 
small economically? The magnitude of this estimate (0.89) implies that during the period 1980-
2010, if France, whose average welfare spending rate on unemployment is 1.61% for this period, 
could decrease this rate to the level of USA during this period, 0.33%, the average total 
unemployment rate of France during this period could be decreased by 1.14 percentage point 
(1.28*0.8878).  
Similarly for all OECD nations, on average, each percentage point increase in unemployment 
welfare expenditure relative to GDP can increase long-term unemployment rate by 4.74 
percentage point. In other words, increasing unemployment welfare spending rate by one 
standard deviation raises long-term unemployment rate by 3.68 percentage point 
(4.7357*0.7773). If France could decrease its average welfare spending rate on unemployment 
across years 1998-2007 to the level of USA for this period, the average long-term unemployment 
rate of France in this period could be decreased by 6.06 percentage point (1.28*4.7357). This 
means among unemployed people, the proportion of those who were unemployed for more than 
one year will be decreased by 6.06%.  Whether the magnitude of these two effects on total and 
long-term unemployment rates is attractive for policy makers to make policy change is up to the 
voters and politicians, but the economic effect of unemployment welfare spending on 
unemployment is definite: a significant positive effect on both the scale and duration of 
unemployment. Whether the magnitude of this effect has a substantial policy significance may be 
country-specific, however, the result gives strong evidence that the gaps in unemployment rates, 
particularly long-term unemployment rate between Europe and US in 1980s and 1990s may be 
partially explained by the differences in welfare spending on unemployment between USA and 
major western European countries. If combing other welfare expenditures, we expect the effect 
would be much larger. 
 
The result on labor participation rate also supports our theoretical hypothesis:  Unemployment 
welfare benefit can raise labor participation rate by preventing people from giving up job 
hunting. Every percentage point increase in unem_exp can increase labor participation rate by 
1.29 percentage point.  
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The theory on the two effects of UI only concerns the behavior of individuals. To examine the 
impact of public unemployment spending on the behavior of business, I also run a regression of 
it on investment rate with control variables including inflation, long real interest rate and trade 
openness. The estimate of the coefficient of unemployment spending rate is -2.07 and significant 
at 5% level. Every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure 
relative to GDP can decrease capital formation as a percentage of GDP by over two percentage 
point. The mechanism of this decrease may be because higher unemployment insurance tax used 
to fund UI increases business cost thus dampening incentive to make more investment or because 
people have less incentive to save when welfare benefits from entitlement programs are available 
and therefore business is more difficult to finance investments due to lower saving rate. Further 
empirical work is worthy to explore which mechanism is the most important. 
 
5. The Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis 
To check the robustness of our estimation results to specification change, I re-run the model (3) 
with two control variables changed and one control variable added:  labor productivity growth 
replaced by multi factor productivity growth rate and terms of trade shock by the lagged value of 
terms of trade change. The added control variable is net migration rate, which is defined as the 
difference between immigration into and emigration from the country during the year per 1 000 
inhabitants.  
The motivation of adding this explanatory variable is during economic downturns, it is often the 
case that native workers blame high unemployment rate on immigrants. Simply put, they argue 
that immigrants are taking away jobs from natives. By adding net migration rate (migrate) as an 
additional control variable, we can test both whether the estimates of effects of public 
unemployment spending are robust to specification change and whether immigrants have any 
negative effect on unemployment measures.  
The estimates of the coefficients for total and long-term unemployment rates in table 7 are very 
close to those in table 6 with only slight changes in magnitude. The magnitude is slightly higher 
for total unemployment rate (unemp) and slightly lower for long term unemployment rate. The 
estimate for unemp_exp is more significant now. With specification change, the effect of public 
unemployment spending rate on youth unemployment becomes significant at 5% level. We also 
note that all estimates for the coefficients of migration rate are significant and negative. Opposite 
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to the widely heard accusation in press, immigrants are helping, rather than hindering, both the 
scale and duration of overall employment, which is consistent with the findings of Giovanni Peri 
(2010) and Vedder (1994). 
 
 
6. Discussion 
To answer the question “Is government’s help for unemployed people helpful for the society?”, 
empirical evidences are more important than theoretical debate. Most policies are likely to have 
opposing effects. The key to policy making is what the net effect is. Our econometric study 
clearly shows that higher public unemployment welfare expenditure leads to higher 
unemployment rate, both in number and in duration.  The motivation of all welfare programs for 
unemployed people is undoubtedly noble: helping unemployed people, however, is government’s 
help for unemployed people helpful for the society? Unfortunately the fact may not be a simple 
yes. As Anderson (2012) points out, “In the case of unemployment insurance, it is ironic that 
those whose political and policy fortunes have been most tied to the desire for a lower 
unemployment rate likely have contributed to a higher national unemployment rate through 
unfortunate choices”.  
The finding of this paper supports Barro (2012)’s argument that unemployment insurance is 
subsidizing unemployment and thus promoting unemployment. He argued that “the 
unemployment-insurance program involves a balance between compassion—providing for 
persons temporarily without work—and efficiency. The loss in efficiency results partly because 
the program subsidizes unemployment, causing insufficient job-search, job-acceptance and 
levels of employment. A further inefficiency concerns the distortions from the increases in taxes 
required to pay for the program.” He further pointed out that “generous unemployment-insurance 
programs have been found to raise unemployment in many Western European countries in which 
unemployment rates have been far higher than the current U.S. rate. In Europe, the influence has 
worked particularly through increases in long-term unemployment.” The Econometric estimation 
of this study indicates that every percentage point increase in unemployment entitlement 
expenditure  relative to GDP can lead to 4.5 to 4.7 percentage point increase in long term 
unemployment rate, providing evidence to support Barro’s claim. Barro provided a quantitative 
example to show the effect on US economy of the expansion of unemployment-insurance 
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eligibility to as much as 99 weeks from the standard 26 weeks by American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act passed by Congress in February 2009.  
“To begin with a historical perspective, in the 1982 recession the peak unemployment rate of 
10.8% in November-December 1982 corresponded to a mean duration of unemployment of 17.6 
weeks and a share of long-term unemployment (those unemployed more than 26 weeks) of 
20.4%. Long-term unemployment peaked later, in July 1983, when the unemployment rate had 
fallen to 9.4%. At that point, the mean duration of unemployment reached 21.2 weeks and the 
share of long-term unemployment was 24.5%. These numbers are the highest observed in the 
post-World War II period until recently. Thus, we can think of previous recessions (including 
those in 2001, 1990-91 and before 1982) as featuring a mean duration of unemployment of less 
than 21 weeks and a share of long-term unemployment of less than 25%. 
These numbers provide a stark contrast with joblessness today. The peak unemployment rate of 
10.1% in October 2009 corresponded to a mean duration of unemployment of 27.2 weeks and a 
share of long-term unemployment of 36%. The duration of unemployment peaked (thus far) at 
35.2 weeks in June 2010, when the share of long-term unemployment in the total reached a 
remarkable 46.2%. These numbers are way above the ceilings of 21 weeks and 25% share 
applicable to previous post-World War II recessions. The dramatic expansion of unemployment-
insurance eligibility to 99 weeks is almost surely the culprit.” 
The data used in this paper has only covered public unemployment expenditure (% of GDP) up 
to year 2007 for USA, so we cannot see the effect of this UI program extension from our data. 
However, the real data beyond the data used for econometric estimation in this paper validates 
the conclusion from this estimation, serving as a sort of quasi experiment as 2008 financial crisis 
was unexpected to most people. 
Barro argued that one potential mechanism through which UI program impacts unemployment 
rate is “the distortions from the increases in taxes required to pay for the program”. According to 
Rosen (2008), the cost to the employer in increased taxes used to fund UI program is less than 
the benefits that would be paid to the employee upon layoff. The firm in this instance believes 
that it is more cost effective to lay off the employee, causing more unemployment than under 
perfect experience rating. Consequently, firm will decrease investment and economy shrinks. 
This hypothesis is supported by our econometric finding in table 6 that every percentage point 
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increase in unemployment public expenditure rate leads to 4.2 percentage point decrease in 
investment rate. 
Our results show that the stimulative aggregate demand effect of public unemployment 
expenditure does not get support from the data while incentive effect hypothesized in theory has 
robust empirical support, only the impacts of UI program on supply side of labor market seems 
to be more important. However, the disincentive effect of UI program on business investment 
may also affect demand side of labor market negatively, worsening unemployment and economic 
growth. The help to individuals may not always be aligned with the interests of the society, 
policy makers need to take this into account to strike a balance for decisions involving economic 
trade-off. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Using panel data of public unemployment expenditure as a percentage of GDP of 34 OECD 
nations across year 1980-2010, I explore the effect of this ratio on three unemployment 
outcomes: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment, as 
well as labor participation rate and investment rate. After taking into account potential 
endogeneity of this ratio using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, I find the data does not support the 
hypothesized aggregate demand effect of unemployment insurance (UI) expenditure in theory 
but gives strong support for hypothesized disincentive effect in theory. The estimates indicate 
that every percentage point increase in public unemployment welfare expenditure relative to 
GDP leads to 0.9 to 1.1 percentage point increase in total unemployment rate and 4.5 to 4.7 
percentage point increase in long term unemployment rate. The distortionary effect of UI 
program on business is also verified by an estimate that every percentage point increase in this 
unemployment spending rate is associated with about 2.1 percentage point decrease in 
investment rate. 
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Table 1 The variable definitions, data sources and time coverage of data 
variable Definition Data source Time coverage 
dtot 
Percentage change in the terms of trade weighted by the 
trade openness of the country WDI2010 1981 - 2010 
Unem_exp 
Public social expenditure on unemployment program as a 
percentage of GDP OECD (2010) 1960 - 2010 
hours 
Average hours actually worked: 
Hours per year per person in employment OECD Factbook 2010 1980 - 2012 
inflation 
Inflation rate: Consumer price indices (CPI): annual growth in 
percentage OECD Factbook 2010 1955 - 2008 
invrate 
Investment rate: the share of total GDP that is devoted to 
investment in fixed assets OECD Factbook 2010 1976 - 2006 
Labor_prodg Labor productivity growth rate OECD StatExtracts 1990 - 2011 
Long_real_r 
long real interest rate :The nominal returns on long-term 
government bond minus the actual inflation rate over the 
following year OECD (2012) 1955 - 2008 
Long_unem2 
Long unemployment rate: proportion of people who have 
been unemployed for 12 months or more among all 
unemployed WDI2010 1980 - 2010 
mf_prodg Multi-factor Productivity growth OECD StatExtract 1985 - 2010 
migrate 
Net migration rate: The difference between immigration into 
and emigration from the area during the year per 1 000 
inhabitants OECD Factbook 2010 1955 - 2008 
popd Population density (people per square km of land area) WDI2010 1961 - 2010 
road Road fatalities Per million inhabitants OECD Factbook 2010 1990 - 2008 
Trade_open International trade openness (% of GDP) WDI2010 1960 - 2008 
unemp Unemployment rate OECD Factbook 1955 - 2010 
women 
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 
(%) WDI2010 1990 - 2011 
hh_consumr    household consumption rate (% of GDP) WDI2010 1966-2005 
logypc Log of per capita GDP  WDI2010 1975-2005 
Youth_unem2 Youth unemployment rate: % of youth labour force (15-24) WDI2010 1980 - 2010 
wageg 
Wage growth rate: annual growth rate of labor compensation 
per labor unit OECD StatExtracts 1971-2008 
WDI2010: World Development Indicator 2010 Edition, World Bank.   
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Table 2 Summary Statistics for variables used in the models 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
unemp 989 6.5237 3.7334 0.1 20.1494 
long_unem2 817 32.4050 17.8792 0.3 76.2 
youth_unem2 889 15.5267 8.2267 2.6 43.9 
unem_exp 322 0.9078 0.7773 0 3.4 
labor_prodg 694 1.9347 2.4922 -11.6 17.5 
mf_prodg 456 1.2140 1.7142 -7.6 7.6 
dtot 688 0.0198 1.8160 -10.2448 22.5451 
inflation 1513 12.1580 47.3427 -3.5 1281.4 
trade_open 1187 34.8219 21.5213 4 160.5 
popd 1622 115.4203 113.2750 1.3646 508.8568 
invrate 1193 22.8427 4.1450 14.8 37.5 
Long_real_r 774 3.182571 3.1332 -21.17 14.63 
migrate 1512 1.6707 4.4158 -23.1 40.3 
hh_consumr    1170 58.5843 6.937004 39.70264 79.74503 
wageg 784 8.436097 10.69219 -2.5 101.8 
hours 921 1821.605 237.4955 1334 2923 
logypc 365 10.06548 .409891 9.051459 11.08429 
road 637 115.2418 46.6745 37 316 
 
      
Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Unemployment Rates and Welfare Measures 
 
unemp long_u~2 youth_~2 labor_~i invrate hours hh_con~r logypc unem_exp 
unemp 1 
        
long_unem2 0.5777*** 1 
       
youth_unem2 0.8824*** 0.5782*** 1 
      
labor_parti -0.4231*** -0.6018*** -0.5113*** 1 
     
invrate -0.3347*** -0.0803** -0.231*** 0.0641 1 
    
hours 0.0172 -0.0714* 0.1028*** -0.1973*** 0.407*** 1 
   
hh_consumr 0.2842*** 0.176*** 0.3*** -0.1723*** -0.2097*** 0.3263*** 1 
  
logypc -0.4944*** -0.2868*** -0.4127*** 0.4102*** -0.1869*** -0.6149*** -0.5717*** 1 
 
unem_exp 0.1135* 0.1535*** -0.006 -0.0284 -0.2078*** -0.5372*** -0.3515*** 0.312*** 1 
 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 4  The results of tests for disincentive effect and aggregate demand effect of UI 
Test effect Model 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P value 
for SE 
R-
square N 
IV strength 
F statistic  DWH statistic 
 LSDV hours Unem_exp -24.7977 7.37 0.001 0.99 309    
 LSDV road hours 0.0576 0.0176 0.001 0.88 574    
 LSDV road Unem_exp -19.054 3.7118 0.000 0.91 322    
Disincentive 
effect LSDV Unem_exp road -0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.95 274 25.28(0)   
   labor_prodg 0.0058 0.0069 0.40      
   wageg -0.005 0.0031 0.874      
 LSDV hours Unem_exp -68.2635 23.5246 0.004 0.99 264    
   wageg -1.4713 0.43315 0.001      
   labor_prodg -1.6904 0.8530 0.049      
  
 
Residual from 
IV test 49.2408** 24.7551 0.048     3.96 (0.0479) 
 IV hours Unem_exp -68.174 23.4735 0.004 0.99 264    
   wageg -1.3681 0.4395 0.002      
   labor_prodg -1.6002 0.8603 0.063      
Aggregate 
demand 
effect LSDV Unem_exp road -.0075*** .0013 0.000 0.96 230 35.62(0)   
   inflation -.0308 .0161 0.057      
   wageg -.0263 .0091 0.004      
   long_real_r 0.007 .0144 0.630      
 LSDV hh_consumr    unem_exp -1.3169 1.297 0.312 0.98 180    
   wageg -.0984 0.069 0.156      
   long_real_r .1592 .1033 0.126      
   inflation -.1661 .1168 0.157      
  
 
Residual from 
IV test 1.900 1.4011 0.177     1.84(0.177) 
 LSDV hh_consumr    unem_exp .2651 .5697 0.642 0.98 180    
   wageg -.0628 0.064 0.328      
   long_real_r .1548 .1036 0.137      
   inflation -.1260 .1133 0.268      
            
 LSDV logypc unem_exp -.0834** .0342 0.016 0.99 188    
   wageg -.0048 .0019 0.013      
   long_real_r -.0068 .0025 0.012      
   inflation -.0077 .0028 0.007      
  
 
Residual from 
IV test .0729* .0379 0.056     3.71 (0.0561) 
            
 OLS logypc unem_exp -.0227* .0133 0.090 0.99 188    
   wageg -.0032 .0017 0.070      
   long_real_r -.0074 .0026 0.006      
   inflation -.0064 .0029 0.030      
 IV logypc unem_exp -.0755*** 0.029 0.009 0.99 188    
   wageg -.0038 .0017 0.023      
   long_real_r -.0064 .0025 0.012      
   inflation -.0077 .0028 0.007      
All the regressions include both time and country fixed effects. 
Within parenthesis is p value. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
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Table 5  The results of IV strength test & DWH endogeneity test 
Test 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
P value 
for SE 
R-
square N 
IV 
strength 
F statistic  DWH statistic 
IV strength Unem_exp road -0.0053 0.0012 0.000 0.96 230 18.07(0)   
  long_real_r 0.0110 0.0136 0.421      
  labor_prodg 0.0173 0.0099 0.082      
  trade_open -0.0050 0.0049 0.304      
  popd 0.0217 0.0070 0.002      
  inflation -0.0314 0.0149 0.036      
  dtot 0.0020 0.0087 0.815      
DWH 
Endogeneity unemp         2.30 (0.131) 
 Long_unem2         0.94 (0.3323) 
 Youth_unem2         1.81 (0.1803) 
 Labor_parti         15.07 (0.001) 
 invrate         2.93(0.0886) 
DWH endogeneity test for health outcome and labor participation is a regression of one unemployment measure (one of unemp, long_unem2, 
youth_unem2) on unem_exp, long_real_r, labor_prodg, trade_open, popd, inflation, dtot , dummy variables for each country , dummy variables 
for each year and the residual from the IV strength test.  
DWH endogeneity test for invrate  is a regression of invrateon unem_exp, inflation, long_real_r , trade_open and   the residual from the IV 
strength test.  
                                                                                              
 All the regressions include both time and country fixed effects. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
LSDV=Least Square Dummy Variable estimation model for panel data; IV= Instrumental Variable estimation for panel data. 
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Table 6 The results of Final Models for Three Unemployment Rates, labor participation rate and investment rate 
 unemp long_unem2 Youth_unem2 Labor_parti invrate invrate 
One year lagged 
value of 
response 
variable 
0.7914 
(0.0819)*** 
0.6495(0.0777)*** 0.8389 
(0.0572)*** 
0.8474(0.0553)***   
Unem_exp 0.8878 (0.3790)** 4.7357 (1.0252)*** 1.3416 (0.8727) 1.2938 (0.4793)*** -2.0673 (0.8092)** -4.2209(1.3005)*** 
Labor_prodg 0.0193 (0.0341) 0.0880 (1.0252) 0.0407 (0.0781) -0.0633 (0.0331)**   
dtot 0.0091 (0.0212) -0.0370 (0.0687) 0.0231 (0.0405) -0.0001 (0.0226)   
inflation 0.1760 
(0.0472)*** 
-0.5798 
(0.1851)*** 
0.3628 
(0.0959)*** 
0.1501 (0.0393)*** 0.2263(0.2239) .1569(.1174) 
Long_real_r 0.1558 
(0.0586)*** 
-0.0694 (0.2075) 0.3873 
(0.1291)*** 
-0.0728 (0.0407)* -0.3618(0.1739)** -.3323(0.10)*** 
Trade_open -0.0527 (0.0270)** 0.1055 (0.0720) -0.1200(0.0569)** -0.0085(0.0156)*** -
0.1833(0.0419)*** 
-.1691(.0304)*** 
popd 0.0482 (0.0267)* -0.1084 (0.1277)  0.0989(0.0676) -0.0164 (0.0280)   
model IV IV IV IV LSDV IV 
Instrument 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and three-
year lagged values 
of response variable 
+ road 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable + road 
R square 0.9727 0.9840 0.9704 0.9632 0.8451 0.8315 
N 230 216 230 375 254 254 
Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis.  
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country.  
LSDV=Least Square Dummy Variable estimation model for panel data; IV= Instrumental Variable estimation for panel data. 
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Table 7  Sensitivity analysis 
 unemp long_unem2 Youth_unem2 Labor_parti 
One year lagged 
value of response 
variable 
0.5743(0.1094)*** .6592 (.0779)*** .6490 (.0869)*** .8153(.1008)*** 
Unem_exp 1.1396 (0.3283)*** 4.4957(1.0364)*** 1.7309(.7404)** .8589(.4984)* 
migrate -0.0655(0.0260)** -.3928 (.1417)*** -.1030(.0568)* .07186(.0184)*** 
mf_prodg -0.0457 (0.0641) -.1049 (.1875) -.1018 (.118) -.0232(.0403) 
ldtot 0.0517 (0.0628) -.4962 (.356) .125(.1476) .1111(0.04)*** 
inflation -0.0808 (0.0640) -1.0708 (.3867)*** -.04(.1837) .1019(.0552)* 
Long_real_r 0.0136(0.0616) -.92101(.3007)*** -.049(.179) -.1575(.0531)*** 
Trade_open 0.0209 (0.0172) .1232 (.0956) .0423(.046) -.0062(.0253) 
popd -0.0025 (0.0310)* -.1166 (.1156) -.0532( .0849) .0145(0.046) 
DWH statistic for 
unem_exp 
0.02(0.876) 0.40(0.5294) 1.17(0.2812) 6.69(0.0109) 
model IV IV IV IV 
Instrument variable Two-year and three-
year lagged values of 
response variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable 
Two-year and 
three-year lagged 
values of response 
variable + road 
R square 0.9593 0.98 0.96 0.99 
N 151 138 151 151 
For upper panel, robust clustered standard errors are in parenthesis; For bottom panel, p values are in parenthesis. 
 *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively.  
All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country. 
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